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A Hybrid Unsupervised Clustering-Based Anomaly Detection Method
Guo Pu, Lijuan Wang , Jun Shen, and Fang Dong
Abstract: In recent years, machine learning-based cyber intrusion detection methods have gained increasing
popularity. The number and complexity of new attacks continue to rise; therefore, effective and intelligent solutions
are necessary. Unsupervised machine learning techniques are particularly appealing to intrusion detection systems
since they can detect known and unknown types of attacks as well as zero-day attacks. In the current paper,
we present an unsupervised anomaly detection method, which combines Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) and One
Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) to detect attacks without any prior knowledge. The proposed approach is
evaluated using the well-known NSL-KDD dataset. The experimental results demonstrate that our method performs
better than some of the existing techniques.
Key words: unsupervised learning; clustering; intrusion detection; feature selection

1

Introduction

Cyber security refers to the technologies, processes, and
practices designed to protect internet-connected systems,
including networks, computers, programs, and data from
attacks, destruction or unauthorized access[1, 2] . Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) is one part of the cyber security
systems. IDS is utilized to discover, determine, and
identify intrusions by analyzing data collected through
network devices[3] .
According to the detection mechanism, IDS can
be classified as misuse (also called signature-based)
detection and anomaly (also called behavior-based)
detection[4] . Misuse detection approaches are designed
to detect attacks by using a database of predefined attack
patterns. They are highly effective to detect known
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attacks and preferred for the low false positive rate.
Nonetheless, they are unable to defend the system
against unknown attacks, because such attacks do not
exist in the predefined pattern lists. As network attacks
continue to increase in the frequency and diversity,
maintaining an updated database is time-consuming
and unfeasible. Moreover, misuse detection approaches
cannot detect zero-day attacks. On the other hand,
anomaly detection approaches use the normal system
activity to build normal-operation profiles, identifying
anomalies as behaviors that deviate from the normal ones.
Such methods are especially appealing because they are
able to potentially detect all known and unknown types
of attacks as well as zero-day attacks. However, the main
disadvantage of anomaly detection approaches is that
they require a tuning stage and suffer from high false
positive rates.
To improve the detection rate and minimize the
false positive rates, many studies describe machine
learning techniques for cyber intrusion detection[2, 4, 5] .
The current paper focuses primarily on the anomalybased IDS, which can be generally divided into three
main categories according to the machine learning
methods used: supervised (classification), unsupervised
(clustering and outlier-based detection), and semisupervised[4] . In supervised IDS, a model is trained to
learn from completely labeled data[6, 7] . However, most
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of the classification models have a similar drawback,
namely, in comparison to the misuse-based ones, they
fail to detect unknown attacks, and they need to be
periodically trained to preserve high detection rates. This
is not practical as it is difficult to obtain labeled data.
Semi-supervised IDS creates a model by using a small
amount of labeled data with a large amount of unlabeled
data. On the other hand, in unsupervised IDS, clustering
techniques are utilized for finding anomalies in unlabeled
data. The aim of clustering algorithms is to separate
the given unlabeled data into clusters that achieve
high inner similarity and outer dissimilarity, without
relying on signatures, explicit description of attack
classes, or labeled data for training. Besides the ability
to detect known and unknown attacks, unsupervised
intrusion detection methods do not require labeled data
for the training process. They can answer the attribution
and correlation questions by extracting features from
different sources[4] .
Thus, as the amount and complexity of new attacks
increase, effective and intelligent solutions are crucial.
In the current paper, we describe an unsupervised
clustering-based anomaly detection method, without
any prior knowledge. The key contributions of this
paper are threefold: firstly, the process of unsupervised
anomaly detection based on a clustering technique is
described; secondly, a novel anomaly detection method
based on Sub-Space Clustering (SSC) and One Class
Support Vector Machine (OCSVM) is presented; thirdly,
experiments are conducted to compare the proposed
method with three other approaches by using different
evaluation metrics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces a brief background to the stateof-the-art developments in the unsupervised intrusion
detection field. Section 3 describes the proposed method
and the employed performance metrics. Furthermore,
Section 4 evaluates the developed method using the
well-known NSL-KDD attacks dataset, and compares
its performance with three known methods. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the study and sets proposals for the
future work.

2

Related Work

Over the last two decades, many machine learning
and data mining methods, such as ant colony
optimization[8] , artificial neural networks[9] , particle
swarm optimization[10] , evolutionary computation[11] ,
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and Support Vector Machine (SVM)[12] , have been
proposed for cyber intrusion detection. We primarily
focused on unsupervised approaches that have been
proposed for the intrusion detection in the literature.
In Ref. [5], the authors introduced an unsupervised
anomaly detection method by combining SSC, Evidence
Accumulation (EA), and Density-Based Spatial
Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN)
clustering. The SSC[13] method was used to produce
multiple data partitions by dividing the original feature
space X into N different sub-spaces. In addition, the
DBSCAN[14] clustering method was applied to each
partition. The EA clustering was employed to rank the
degree of abnormality. Subsequently, the well-known
KDD99 dataset was utilized to evaluate the proposed
method. The experimental results demonstrated that this
approach outperformed the traditional methods.
Moreover, Amoli et al.[15] proposed an unsupervised
IDS for high-speed networks, which detected zeroday attacks via two separate engines. The first engine
used the DBSCAN clustering to detect attacks and
the second one found the botnet under different
protocols. To evaluate the proposed model, two publicly
available datasets were used. The presented model
was then evaluated and compared with the K-means
and DBSCAN-based outlier detection approaches.
Furthermore, the study in Ref. [16] applied the K-means
and DBSCAN clustering algorithms to detect anomalous
behaviors in unlabeled network and system log data.
A literature survey of machine learning and data
mining methods for cyber intrusion detection was
also carried out in Ref. [2]. Buczak and Guven[2]
provided example studies, described various methods,
and explained the importance of the datasets for
training and testing the IDS. On the other hand,
Nisioti et al.[4] provided a survey of unsupervised
methods for anomaly-based IDS, as well as presented
and compared feature selection methods for intrusion
detection. They highlighted the importance of feature
selection techniques for decreasing the computational
time and complexity. Lastly, a DBSCAN clustering
method to group normal packets versus anomaly
was presented in Ref. [17]. Blowers and Williams[17]
also summarized the application of machine learning
methods to cyber operations.

3

Clustering-Based Unsupervised Anomaly
Detection

As an unsupervised approach, a clustering technique is
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used to group data according to a similarity measure.
The goal of clustering is to attain high intra-cluster
similarity (i.e., data within a cluster are similar) and
low inter-cluster similarity (i.e., data from different
clusters are dissimilar). There are several approaches
for clustering the input data, two of which are the wellknown K-means and DBSCAN methods.
K-means is a partitioned-based clustering algorithm
that produces sphere-like clusters. It is relatively efficient
and has been used for medium and large sized dataset.
This approach attempts to minimize the intra-cluster
distances and maximize the inter-cluster ones. However,
its drawback is that the number of clusters K must be
pre-specified, which is not a simple or intuitive task.
The correct choice of K is often ambiguous, because
it is highly dependent on the shape and scale of the
distribution of points in a dataset. Moreover, since
the initial centroids are often selected randomly, the
algorithm is easily trapped in the local optimum.
DBSCAN is a density-based clustering algorithm that
produces arbitrarily-shaped clusters. Density is defined
as the number of points within a specified radius. It is
particularly useful when dealing with spatial clusters or
when there is noise in the dataset. It works with two
parameters: radius and minimum points. DBSCAN
is robust to outliers, and it can even find a cluster
completely surrounded by a different cluster. Beyond
that, DBSCAN is remarkably useful in many real world
problems, as it does not require specification of the
number of clusters, such as K in the K-means algorithm.
3.1

SSC-OCSVM algorithm

The current clustering techniques typically lack
robustness. In other words, the results of clustering
algorithms depend on the algorithm itself, and are also
affected by the initialization and parameters of the
underlying algorithm. Inspired by the works in Refs.
[5, 13, 18], to avoid such a limitation, the current paper
proposes an unsupervised anomaly intrusion detection
algorithm called SSC-OCSVM, which combines SSC
and OCSVM to detect attacks.
SSC is an extension of the traditional clustering
techniques. It produces clusters from different small subspaces of the original dataset X 2 Rnm . Let n be the
number of records and m be the number of attributes or
features. The N sub-spaces Xi 2 X (i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g)
is produced by selecting q features from the m attributes.

The number of sub-spaces N corresponds to m
. To set
q
the value of q, the downward closure property is taken,
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which implies that if a collection of samples is in X,
it is also in low-dimensional sub-spaces of X . Using
small values of q is more efficient and faster[5] . Besides,
DBSCAN gives improved results in low-dimensional
spaces[19] . Consequently, we set q D 2 for SSC, which
gives N D m  .m 1/=2.
SVM is a supervised learning model that analyzes
data and recognizes patterns. OCSVM is an extension of
the SVM method and is especially suitable for unlabeled
data[18] . In OCSVM, the support vector model is trained
on data that has only one class, which is the normal class.
It maps the data into the feature space corresponding
to the kernel, and separates them from the origin with
maximum margin[18] .
The methodology of the presented SSC-OCSVM
algorithm has the following steps.
(1) Initialization. Set a null dissimilarity vector D,
and divide the feature space X into N different subspaces Xi 2 X.i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g/.
(2) Clustering and learning. Apply OCSVM to each
sub-space Xi and produce partitions Pi .
(3) Evidence accumulation. Update dissimilarity
vector D based on each partition Pi . Vector D
accumulates the distance between the different outliers
found in sub-space Xi . This operation is inspired by the
idea of the EA clustering[20] .
(4) Anomaly detection. Rank vector D and obtain a
ranked vector Drank . In Drank , if the dissimilarity value
is greater than a predefined threshold value, then the
corresponding sample is considered as an anomaly.
The flowchart of the proposed SSC-OCSVM
algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3.2

Measure

Different metrics have been used to measure how well a
machine learning method performs in detecting attacks.
The most common measures to evaluate the detection
ability are as follows.
 Confusion matrix, also known as error matrix,
compares the actual results with the predicted ones. It
is mainly utilized in supervised learning to evaluate the
prediction accuracy of a classifier. A binary confusion
matrix is shown in Table 1, each row corresponds to
the actual results, while each column corresponds to
the predicted ones. True Positive (TP) refers to the
actual class Y that was correctly classified as class Y ,
False Positive (FP) refers to the actual class YO that was
incorrectly labeled as class Y , False Negative (FN) refers
to the actual class Y that was incorrectly marked as class
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Fig. 1

Flowchart of the SSC-OCSVM algorithm.
Table 1

Actual class
Y
YO

Binary confusion matrix.
Predicted class
Y
TP
FP

YO
FN
TN

YO , and true Negative (TN) refers to the actual class YO
that was correctly classified as class YO .
 Sensitivity or recall or TP Rate (TPR) or probability
of detection or Detection Rate (DR), is the proportion of
positive samples that are correctly classified as such, i.e.,
TPR D TP=.TP C FN/.
 False Alarm Rate (FAR) or FP rate represents the
proportion of samples that are incorrectly identified as
anomalies, i.e., FAR D FP=.FP C TN/.
 The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
is a method of visualizing the DR against the FAR for
different parameter settings. It illustrates the relative
trade-offs between DR (on the y-axis) and FAR (on the
x-axis)[21] .

4
4.1

Experimental Evaluation Using the NSLKDD Dataset
Preprocessing of dataset

The KDD99[22] is the most widely used network attacks
dataset utilized in academia. It includes a wide variety of
intrusions simulated in a military network environment.
However, the significant issues in the original KDD99

149

dataset have been shown to highly affect the performance
of anomaly detection methods. Therefore, NSL-KDD[23]
was proposed to eliminate some of the inherent problems
of the KDD99 dataset[24] . Compared with the original
KDD99 dataset, the number of records in the NSLKDD train and test sets are reasonable, and there are
no redundant records. Consequently, evaluation results
of different research studies will be consistent and
comparable. Thus, we evaluate our proposed algorithm
using the NSL-KDD dataset.
Each record in the NSL-KDD dataset is described by
41 features, as shown in Table 2. Among these features,
protocol type, service, and flag are non-numeric and
should be converted into numeric features. Here, we
adopted a one-hot encoding method to transform
these three features into numerical ones. Following
transforming, the total number of features increased from
41 to 132, and there was a lot of redundancy. Hence, a
feature selection process was necessary.
Feature selection is one of the most important steps
of the unsupervised anomaly detection[4] . It refers to the
process of selecting a subset of the available features that
are the most relevant and non-redundant. The quality of
selected features can not only enhance the accuracy of
the method, but also decrease FAR and computational
time. In other words, it directly affects the detection rate
and the performance of a machine learning method. In
the current paper, we adopted the F-test to select features.
Meanwhile, we normalized each feature by removing
the mean and scaling to unit variance.
4.2

Splitting of dataset

As mentioned in Ref. [4], when clustering technique is
used to detect network attacks, two assumptions exist.
Table 2

Total attributes in the NSL-KDD dataset.
41 features and one label
duration
su attempted
same srv rate
protocol type
num root
diff srv rate
service
num file creations srv diff host rate
flag
num shells
dst host count
src bytes
num access files
dst host srv count
dst bytes
num outbound cmds dst host same srv rate
land
is host login
dst host diff srv rate
wrong fragment is guest login
dst host same src port rate
urgent
count
dst host srv diff host rate
hot
srv count
dst host serror rate
num failed logins serror rate
dst host srv serror rate
logged in
srv serror rate
dst host rerror rate
num compromised rerror rate
dst host srv serror rate
root shell
srv rerror rate
label
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Firstly, the number of normal flows vastly outnumbers
the anomalies. Secondly, there is a qualitative difference
between the anomalies and normal instances. Our
experiment follows the above assumptions in subset
splitting. All of the attacks in the NSL-KDD training
and testing set can be classified into four types: probe
or scan, Denial of Service (DoS), User to Root (U2R),
and Remote to Local (R2L). To evaluate the proposed
algorithm in detecting these four types of attacks as well
as hybrid attacks, respectively, the NSL-KDD dataset
was split into four single attack subsets and a mixed
type subset. The single attack subset consisted of normal
flows and one specific type of attack. The mixed subset
consisted of normal flows and a mixture of all four types
of attacks. The splitting of dataset is demonstrated in
Table 3. The training subset is only used for parameter
tuning. After all the parameters and threshold values
were tuned properly and fixed for the training subset, the
performance of the proposed algorithm on the test subset
was evaluated.
4.3

Analysis of the results

The entire experimental process is shown in Fig. 2.
After processing and splitting the NSL-KDD dataset,
we evaluated our proposed algorithm and compared its
performance with the ones of K-means, DBSCAN, and
the SSC-EA methods as introduced in the study[5] .
K-means and DBSCAN develop outliers and many
clusters of different sizes. In terms of the predefined
threshold, the larger clusters will be identified as normal
flow, and the remaining ones are considered as potential
anomalies. We obtained an ROC curve of these two
algorithms by setting different threshold values.
Our proposed SSC-OCSVM algorithm will eventually
get a sorted dissimilarity vector D. The samples are
considered as potential anomalies if their corresponding
dissimilarity values are greater than the detection
threshold values. Analogously, we obtained the ROC
curve of the SSC-OCSVM algorithm.
The ROC curve of K-means, DBSCAN, SSC-EA, and
Table 3

Fig. 2

Entire experimental process.

SSC-OCSVM on the Test Probe, Test DoS, Test R2L,
Test U2R, and Test mixed subset are illustrated in
Figs. 3 – 7, respectively. From Figs. 3 – 7, it can be
noticed that the ROC curve of our proposed algorithm
SSC-OCSVM has the largest area under curve, both on
the single attack subset and on the mixed one. In other
words, the proposed algorithm is able to detect a large
fraction of attacks with very low FARs. Meanwhile, for
the two low-frequency attack classes, U2R and R2L, it is
difficult to detect them as they resemble normal traffic[4] .
Moreover, our proposed algorithm achieved particularly
high DRs and low FARs in these two attack classes,
which is better than the other three methods.
The DR and FAR of K-means, DBSCAN, SSC-EA,
and SSC-OCSVM of all the subsets are given in Table 4
in value pairs of (DR, FAR). Using Table 4, it was
validated that normally higher DR results in higher FAR

Splitting of the NSL-KDD dataset.
Number of subsets
Attack
type Train Probe Test Probe Train DoS Test DoS Train R2L Test R2L Train U2R Test U2R Train mixed Test mixed
Normal
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
9000
9000
Probe
100
100
–
–
–
–
–
–
100
100
DoS
–
–
100
100
–
–
–
–
100
100
R2L
–
–
–
–
50
50
–
–
50
50
U2R
–
–
–
–
–
–
50
50
50
50
Total
2100
2100
2100
2100
2050
2050
2050
2050
9300
9300
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Fig. 3

Fig. 4

DR vs FAR on Test Probe subset.

Fig. 6

DR vs FAR on Test DoS subset.

Fig. 7
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DR vs FAR on Test U2R subset.

DR vs FAR on Test mixed subset.

algorithm being higher than K-means and DBSCAN
is the sequential execution of each sub-space. It is
noteworthy that in our algorithm, each sub-space was
independent and sub-space could actually be executed
in parallel.

5

Fig. 5

DR vs FAR on Test R2L subset.

and lower DR results in lower FAR. As demonstrated in
Table 4, the performance of our proposed algorithm is
relatively better than that of the other three approaches.
The computation time of SSC-OCSVM, SSC-EA,
DBSCAN, and K-means on the Test mixed subset
are 238.88 s, 1060.76 s, 8.15 s, and 0.69 s, respectively.
The reason for the computation time of our proposed

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we presented an unsupervised anomaly
detection algorithm SSC-OCSVM, which combined subspace clustering and one class support vector machine
to detect attacks without any prior knowledge. We
evaluated the proposed algorithm utilizing the wellknown public NSL-KDD network attacks dataset. In
addition, we compared its performance with three
other clustering algorithms for unsupervised detection
available in the literature. The experimental results
demonstrate that our algorithm is superior. Future work
should focus predominantly on developing an effective
feature selection method. In addition, since each subspace can be clustered independently, the approach can
be adapted for parallel computing. We will therefore

Tsinghua Science and Technology, April 2021, 26(2): 146–153
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Subset
Train Probe
Test Probe
Train DoS
Test DoS
Train R2L
Test R2L
Train U2R
Test U2R
Train mix
Test mix

Table 4 Comparison of each algorithm in terms of DR and FAR.
SSC-OCSVM
SSC-EA
DBSCAN
(0.95, 0.0680)
(0.95, 0.0635)
(0.99, 0.0810)
(0.99, 0.0660)
(0.93, 0.0795)
(0.85, 0.0285)
(0.93, 0.0690)
(0.90, 0.0810)
(0.98, 0.0790)
(0.85, 0.0780)
(0.90, 0.0600)
(0.87, 0.0950)
(0.68, 0.0960)
(0.18, 0.0980)
(0.38, 0.0760)
(0.52, 0.0895)
(0.30, 0.0950)
(0.40, 0.0335)
(0.84, 0.0925)
(0.70, 0.0955)
(0.84, 0.0690)
(0.90, 0.0905)
(0.84, 0.0920)
(0.52, 0.0355)
(0.91, 0.0900)
(0.87, 0.0950)
(1.00, 0.0900)
(0.89, 0.0800)
(0.84, 0.0980)
(0.80, 0.0840)

implement the parallelization of our algorithm in our
future research.
[10]
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